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Remittances and Institutions:  








This paper addresses the complex and overlooked relationship between the receipt of 
workers’ remittances and institutional quality in the recipient country. Using a simple model, 
we show how an increase in remittance inflows can lead to deterioration of institutional 
quality – specifically, to an increase in the share of funds diverted by the government for its 
own purposes. In a cross section of 111 countries we empirically verify this proposition and 
find that a higher ratio of remittances to GDP leads to lower indices of control of corruption, 
government effectiveness, and rule of law, even after controlling for potential reverse 
causality. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION  
Inflows of workers’ remittances have been growing rapidly in many developing countries at 
least since the early 1990s. With recent estimates putting remittances at $135 billion, they 
now rival and even exceed other types of balance of payments inflows that have traditionally 
received much more attention. Since 1998, these private income transfers—at least those 
flowing through official channels—have been second only to FDI flows, but several times 
larger than remaining private capital inflows and official aid (World Bank (2006), IMF 2005, 
and Chami et al. 2008). 
  
There is now a substantial literature that documents the welfare-enhancing benefits of 
remittances for the recipients. For example, remittances are credited with reducing poverty, 
and their compensatory nature is responsible for minimizing consumption volatility of 
transfer recipients (See, for example, Chami, Fullenkamp, and Jahjah (2003), World Bank 
(2006), IMF (2005), among others). Researchers, however, have also recognized that these 
flows entail several development challenges, specifically in terms of their effect on growth 
[see, for example, Chami et al. (2003), World Bank (2006), and IMF (2005)], and Dutch 
disease effect [see for example, Acosta, Lartey and Mandelman (2007), among others].  
 
In contrast to the well documented impact of remittances on recipient households, the 
macroeconomic impact of these flows has received scant attention. Recently, however, 
Chami, Cosimano and Gapen (2006) show that remittances also affect fiscal policy in the 
recipient countries. For example, by increasing the revenue base, remittances reduce the 
marginal cost to the household of government distortionary policy. Conversely, for a given 
level of distortion, remittances allow the government to carry more debt or incur more 4 
expenditures. These flows, therefore, have similar budgetary implications and incentive 
effects on government behavior as do natural resources such as oil.   
 
This latter effect of such windfalls on government behavior was highlighted recently by  
Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003), who show that the natural resource curse can lead to 
lower long-term growth for countries with oil and minerals. According to them, these 
windfalls may increase reduce the quality of institutions and governance in these countries, 
with adverse effects on growth. The revenue from oil and minerals plays a buffer role 
between government and citizens: because the government can substitute these windfalls for 
taxes to finance a larger and less efficient public sector, the incentive for citizens to monitor 
and hold the government accountable are reduced. As a result, rent-seeking and corruption 
increase, reducing the quantity and quality of investment.   Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian 
go on to argue that by disbursing the revenue from these resources among the people, the 
adverse incentive effect on government behavior may be mitigated. 
 
In this paper, we test whether remittance flows, by also acting as a buffer between 
government and the people, impact the quality of institutions in countries that receive these 
flows. To our knowledge, this is the first such exercise measuring the impact of remittance 
flows on government behavior. At first glance, one might ask why these private income 
transfers should impact government policy, especially given that these flows are not taxed 
and, as a result, not mediated by the recipient-country government. Instead, they are 
household-to-household non-market private income transfers, widely dispersed, and usually 
allocated in small amounts. So one might expect [as is argued in World Bank (2006)] that 
remittances may escape or avoid the adverse effects of oil windfalls on institutional quality. 5 
 
We show, however, that the presence of these flows will nevertheless affect the incentives 
faced by the government, and may therefore have important impacts on the quality of 
domestic governance.  We focus specifically on the government’s incentives to divert 
resources for its own use, which we will label generically as “corruption.”  Remittances 
inflows may affect these incentives through either or both of two channels.  First, even when 
remittances are not taxed directly, their presence expands the base for other taxes (e.g., the 
VAT), thereby making it less costly for the government to appropriate resources for its own 
purposes. Second, the nontaxable exogenous resources that remittances provide for 
households makes it possible for them to finance the purchase of goods that may substitute 
for public services. In that case, access to remittance income makes government corruption 
less costly for domestic households to bear, and consequently such corruption is likely to 
increase. 
 
In Section 2, we construct a simple model illustrating these points. These insights motivate 
our empirical work.   In Section 3, we use standard cross-country regressions to explore the 
effects of remittance inflows on institutional quality in the recipient countries, and conduct 
several robustness checks. We are well aware that remittances could be endogenous to the 
presence of corruption, or more broadly to the quality of domestic economic institutions in 
general, since it is quite plausible that poor domestic governance could lead to larger 
emigration, which itself could lead to increased remittances. We attempt to isolate the 
causality from remittances to corruption through an instrumental variable approach. Our 
results point to a negative and robust impact of remittances on the quality of governance in 
countries that receive these flows. In Section 4 we conclude, however, that the prescription 6 
advocated for resolving the dilemma of the impact of revenue from oil and minerals on 
government behavior—that is by disbursing the revenue from such windfalls—does not 
transfer to the case of remittances, which are already disbursed in this manner. Instead, we 
offer alternative policy advice for countries that rely on these flows.  
 
II.   A SIMPLE MODEL: PUBLIC GOOD PROVISION IN THE PRESENCE OF NON-TAXABLE 
REMITTANCES 
We begin by developing a simple model that outlines a plausible channel through which the 
presence of non-taxable private income transfers to households, such as remittances, can 
affect the quality of domestic governance. We use the term “government effectiveness” in 
this model to refer to the extent to which resources are devoted to increasing the welfare of a 
representative agent, rather than diverted for other purposes such as furthering the wellbeing 
of the public-sector decision-maker. Thus, the notion of effectiveness captured in our model 
most naturally corresponds to government corruption.  
 
We assume that households choose consumption to maximize their utility, while an 
intrinsically non-benevolent government is interested in both its (financial) welfare as well as 
that of the household.
1  For simplicity, the model has only 2 goods. One is a private good that 
must be purchased by the household, and the other a good that could be provided by the 
government or purchased by the household. The source of funding for the latter, which we 
will refer to for simplicity as the “public service,” does not affect the marginal utility derived 
                                                  
1 Presumably the government would not be able to maintain political power if it did not care to some degree 
about the wellbeing of households.  
 7 
from its consumption. That is, whether provided by the government or by the household, the 
good is of the same quality. The intention is to capture the fact that many of the services that 
are provided by the public sector in recipient countries can also be acquired privately. For 
example, households can decide to buy education and health care services or even security 
services on their own if the public provision of these services is non-existent or is of poor 
quality.
2   In general, given the assumed uniformity of quality, households would prefer for 
the government to provide the public service as long as the increase in taxes due to this 
provision does not offset the benefit they derive from these goods. For simplicity we assume 
initially that the tax rate is independent of the provision of the public service by the 
government. Our objective is to show in this simple framework that an increase in these non-
taxable private income transfers from abroad to households in the country of origin can 
impact the provision of public services.  
 
A.   The Representative Agent Problem 
Households care about their consumption of the private good as well as the public service. 
They take the government provision of the latter to be exogenous, and choose their own 
consumption of the two types of goods, c and g, to maximize:  
 
                                                  
2 Households in many developing countries that receive remittances use these private income transfers to 
purchase goods and services (from private suppliers) that are usually provided by the public sector [see, for 
example, Roth (1987)]. An example of this substitution between publicly and privately funded services—can be 
seen with the recent rise in the hometown associations (HTA), which became very common in particular in 
Latin America. These philanthropic organizations, comprised of emigrants from a particular country, generally 
provide financial assistance to their communities in that country, by pooling the transfers among them, and 
using them to finance projects back home. For example, HTAs are often involved in providing support to public 
infrastructure activities such as construction of roads, schools and health facilities. In many cases, however, 
their contributions dwarf that of the public works budget in their countries of origin (see for example, Mexican 
HTA, in Orozco and Lapointe 2003). 
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  ( , , ) log( ) (1 )log( ) U c g g c g g a a = + - +   ( 1 ) 
 
where c is the agent’s consumption of the private good, and g is the agent’s consumption of a 
good that is a perfect substitute for the public good, while  g is the level of government 
provision of the public good. The agent’s budget constraint is the following:  
 
  (1 ) t y R c g - + = +   ( 2 ) 
 
Where y is the agent’s income, t the tax rate, and R (which stands for remittances) represents 
the foreign non-taxable private income transfers received from abroad. The assumption that 
remittances are non-taxed accords with the general situation in recipient countries [see, for 
example, World Bank (2006), among others]. 
 
Maximizing (1) subject to (2) yields:  
 
  [ ]
-
- + - - = g R y t g a a ) 1 ( ) 1 ( *   ( 3 ) 
 
Therefore, taking the level of government provision of the public good as given, private 
purchases of the public good are increasing in household disposable income (domestic and 
foreign) and decreasing in the government’s provision of the good. This result is intuitive: 
when households prefer to keep relatively constant the share of a good in their consumption 9 
basket, a higher endowment of a certain good ( g ) will decrease the demand for this good (g), 
everything else equal, and increase consumption of the other goods (c).  
 
B.   The Government’s Problem 
One central assumption in this model is that the government does not behave like a central 
planner. In particular, suppose that the government cares about maximizing a combination of 
the representative agent’s utility and its own utility, derived from resources that the 
government reserves for itself. In that case the government’s problem consists of 
maximizing:  
 
  ) , , ( ) 1 ( ) log( ) , ( g g c U s U g b b - + = Y   ( 4 ) 
 
where s stands for whatever the government keeps for its own consumption.  The 
government chooses how much of the resources that it collects to divert for its own purposes. 
It therefore chooses  g to maximize (4) subject to the budget constraint:
3  
 
  s g ty + =   ( 5 ) 
                                                  
3 The assumption that government chooses spending while holding revenue constant is more realistic than the 
alternative, because taxes tend not to be as volatile in general as government spending  (see Poterba and 
Rotemberg 1990).  However, this assumption is without loss of generality.  Since tax revenues and spending 
enter equation (6) below only in the form ty – g, our conclusions would be unaffected if we made the alternative 
assumption. 10 
As mentioned earlier, remittances are not taxed, and we do assume that the government does 
not change the tax rate. Later on we will consider what happens when this assumption is 
relaxed.  
 
C.   Stackelberg Game  
Since the government knows the problem of the representative agent and therefore the 
reaction of private agents to its own spending decisions, it will take this reaction into account 
in its optimization problem. However, since it is highly unlikely that private agents could 
cooperate so as to be able to play a Nash bargaining game with the government, it is most 
natural to assume that individual private agents take the government’s provision of the public 
good as fixed and unaffected by their actions.
4  Therefore we assume that our model 
economy works as a Stackelberg game where the government moves first. Under this 
assumption, and replacing (3) and (2) in the objective function of the government yields the 
following:  
 
( ) log( ) (1 ){ log[ ((1 ) )] (1 )log[(1 )((1 ) )]} g ty g t y R g t y R g b b a a a a Y = - + - - + + + - - - + + , 
which simplifies to:  
 
( ) ( ) log( ) (1 ) log( ) 1 log(1 ) log((1 ) ) g ty g t y R g b b a a a a   Y = - + - + - - + - + +              ( 6 ) 
 
                                                  
4 For example, if all agents decreased their private consumption of the public good they might be able to force 
the government to increase its own spending; however such an assumption would obviously be unrealistic. 11 
When  ) (g Y  is maximized with respect to  g it yields:  
 
  * ( ) g t y R b b = - -    ( 7 ) 
 
Equation (7) simply says that the public provision of the public good is increasing in the tax 
base, y, but decreasing in the amount of (non-taxed) remittances.
5 The substitutability 
between private and public provision of the good g, however, implies that an increase in the 
tax base y does not fully translate into an increase in the provision of the public good 
-
g . 
Instead, part of that increase in the revenue base, which includes remittances,  ) ( R y + b , is 
diverted to the government’s own consumption. Given this optimal level of spending on the 
public good, we can easily derive the optimal level of resources diverted to the government’s 
own consumption:  
 
  ) ( * R y s + = b   ( 8 ) 
 
Note that the amount diverted does not depend on the tax rate, but is increasing in the 
revenue base, that is, income and remittances. The “fiscal space” provided by the revenue 
base, and in particular, the remittances, increases the household’s private consumption of 
                                                  
5 Since we know it is virtually always the case that government-spending increases with GDP we assume that 
b > t , in other words, that there is a threshold level of government self-interestb  such that governments with 
levels of b  beyond this threshold are easily ousted from power. 12 
both goods  ) , ( g c , which allows the government to free ride and reduce its contribution to the 
public good, thereby increasing its own consumption.  
 
It is also clear that the government’s proclivity to divert resources to its own consumption, 
measured by b  leaves the household worse off in equilibrium: replacing (3) and (7) into (1) 
we have:  
  0
) 1 (
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We can express the rate of resource diversion as a ratio either to total government spending 
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As one can easily see:  
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III.   EVIDENCE  
The model in section 2 suggested a channel through which remittances can increase the level 
of corruption in a country, even though they do not provide a direct source of revenue for the 
government. We now turn to the data to see if the evidence is consistent with such an effect. 
We use a cross section of 111 countries, chosen on the basis of the availability of data on 
workers’ remittances. Our remittance variable is measured as the average ratio of worker 
remittance flows to GDP between 1990 and 2000. It is enough for a country to have one 
observation on remittances during this period to be in our sample. A detailed description of 
the data and a listing of data sources are included in Appendix B, Tables 9 and 10.  
 
A.   OLS Results 
To ensure that our results can be compared with those in the literature that studies the 
determinants of government quality, we use the framework of the seminal work by La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1999) —henceforth PLSV— and add our own 
regressors. Our main regression model is therefore the following:  
 
s remittance * legal * religion * economic * control    Corruption 1 3 2 1 2000 g b b b a + + + + =   (12) 14 
 
Our endogenous variable is taken from the World Bank governance indicators. It is a 
measure of control of corruption (inversely related to the degree of corruption) in the year 
2000. We regress this measure on average remittance receipts between 1990 and 2000 while 
controlling for economic, religion, and legal variables, as in PLSV.  
 
As a first step, we ignore all endogeneity issues stemming from the inclusion of a measure of 
remittances on the right hand side of the regression.  
 
The OLS results are shown in Table 1, Appendix A. In Column (1) we simply regress the 
index of corruption control (denoted Corrup) on remittance flows. We find a negative and 
significant coefficient, as suggested by our model. In column (2) we add a measure of energy 
depletion in the country. Its coefficient turns out to be negative and statistically significant, 
consistent with the findings of many recent studies that oil-rich countries tend to have worse 
institutions on average (see Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003) and Leite and Weidmann, 
(1999)). The coefficient of remittances remains negative and significant. Indeed, this 
coefficient remains negative in all the specifications we use in this paper. In columns (3) and 
(4) we add the regressors that La Porta et al. (1999) use in their regressions (Table 9 in 
Appendix B provides a description of all the regressors used in this paper). We follow their 
approach by alternating the religion and the legal variables as regressors, since they are 
correlated.
6 In column (3) we add the legal variables. Among these, only the dummy for 
                                                  
6 If both sets of variables are combined, the significance of the religious variables drops significantly, while the 
coefficient on remittances does not change significantly and its t-statistic is -1.64 (significant at the 10 percent 
level).  15 
Scandinavian laws is positive and significant, which is similar to the result in La Porta et al. 
(1999). The coefficients on remittances and energy remain negative and significant in this 
specification as well as in column (4), where we replace the legal variables by variables that 
measure the prevalence of certain religions in these countries. Similar to La Porta et al. 
(1999), we find a negative and significant coefficient on both the variables “Muslim” and 
“Catholic” while the coefficient on “Other Denominations” is negative; however, unlike in 
La Porta et. al., it is slightly insignificant. Note that the R-squared improves dramatically in 
columns (3) and (4) when we add the legal or religion variables.  
 
As in PLSV, we add to both specifications real GDP per capita, whose coefficient we find to 
be positive and strongly significant. This captures the idea that richer countries tend to 
demand better institutions. We need to control for this measure of well-being so that the 
coefficients on the other exogenous variables will only reflect the direct impact of these 
factors on corruption, rather than effects operating indirectly through per capita income. 
However, given the fact that GDP per capita can be endogenous to institutions, its inclusion 
as a regressor needs further discussion, which we postpone to the next section.  
 
The major concern with the results from OLS regressions, however, and in particular with 
respect to the effects of remittance flows, is that remittances could be endogenous to the 
presence of corruption, or more broadly to the quality of domestic economic institutions in 
general. It is very plausible that a higher level of corruption in a country could lead to higher 
emigration, which itself could lead to higher remittances. Therefore we need to isolate the 
causality from remittances to corruption from that operating in the reverse direction. To do 
so, we require an instrument for remittances.  16 
 
B.   The Coastal Area as an Instrument for Remittances 
To instrument properly for remittances we need a variable that is correlated with remittance 
flows but not correlated with our endogenous variable (corruption), except through included 
regressors.  The coastal area of a country (defined as the ratio of the area within 100 KM 
from a sea or an ocean to the total area of the country) appears to satisfy both criteria. As we 
will discuss below, this variable is likely to affect corruption primarily through its effects on 
included regressors such as per capita income.  However, a higher coastal area is generally 
associated with a higher ratio of emigrants to the total population, which for obvious reasons 
leads to higher remittances on average. Accordingly, coastal area appears a priori to be an 
appropriate instrument for remittances.  In a later section of the paper, we check for 
robustness and analyze the exclusion restriction in more detail; for now, we show and discuss 
the instrumental variable regressions.  
 
Table 2 shows the first stage regression for both specifications (the legal variables and the 
religion variables respectively). We find that the impact of the coastal area on remittances is 
large and highly significant. The F statistic on the excluded instrument is equal to 7.59 in the 
first specification and 9.95 in the second, suggesting that our instruments do not suffer from 
significant weakness
7. Columns (3) and (4) show the output from 2SLS second stage 
regressions. In the first specification we find a negative and significant coefficient at the 10% 
level, while in the second specification the significance level improves to 5%. The coefficient 
                                                  
7 Staiger and Stock (1997) set a benchmark of F statistic =10. Our F statistic is close to 10; however we do not 
rule out their weakness and we perform the Conditional Likelihood Ratio test proposed by Moreira (2003). 17 
is very similar across both specifications, however. The Conditional Likelihood Ratio test 
proposed by Moreira (2003), which is robust to weak instruments, shows that the coefficient 
on instrumented remittances is significant at the 5% level
8.  
 
One problem with our instrument is that it may be correlated with institutional quality 
through channels other than remittance flows. In that case, coastal area would be a poor 
instrument, because the instrumented remittance variable would still be correlated with the 
disturbance term (unless these channels are explicitly accounted for in the regressions). 
Coastal area indeed tends to be correlated with variables that have been found to affect 
institutional quality through their effects on living standards, such as per capita real GDP 
itself and a variety of demographic variables that are highly correlated with per capita GDP. 
This is shown in Table 5 in Appendix A. While we did control for real GDP per capita, we 
did not control for the other demographic variables. This raises the question of whether 
instrumenting for remittance flows with coastal area while omitting these demographic 
variables from the regression may result in a biased estimate of the effects of remittance 
flows on institutional quality.
9  
 
                                                  
8 Both specifications are significant at the 1.5% level. 
9 It is worth noting, however, that if this is so, the coefficient on our instrumented remittance variable is likely 
to be biased in the direction opposite to that predicted by our model. This is because, aside from the remittance 
channel, our instrument is generally positively correlated with factors that are associated with better 
institutions
9: for example, our instrument is positively correlated with real GDP per capita, with the level of 
urbanization, and with the degree of commercial openness (as measured by the ratio of trade to GDP). All of 
these factors tend to be associated with better institutional quality, so their exclusion from the regression would 
tend to bias the coefficient on remittances in a positive direction. At the same time, our instrument is negatively 
correlated with age-dependency ratios and infant mortality, factors that are themselves generally negatively 
correlated with institutional quality, again inducing a positive bias.  
 18 
To address this potential bias we need to control for the effects of living standards on 
institutional quality. It is interesting to see that the coefficient on the instrumented remittance 
variable is negative and statistically significant as long as we control for either real GDP per 
capita itself or other variables that are correlated with it, such as dependency ratios, mortality 
rates and/or any combinations of such variables likely to affect institutional quality and to be 
affected by our instrument
10. In columns (3) and (4) of Table 3, for example, we show the 
results from replacing per capita GDP by two demographic variables, dependence and 
urbanization. We can clearly see that these 2SLS regressions with the coastal area as 
instrument yield results similar to the ones in Table 2 columns (3) and (4).  
 
But this procedure creates a second potential endogeneity problem. Like remittances 
themselves, measures of living standards such as per capita GDP are potentially endogenous 
with respect to institutional quality. Although we used the initial level of real GDP per capita 
in our estimation to mitigate this problem, since institutional quality is generally very 
persistent the endogeneity of GDP might still be an issue. Accordingly, we also instrument 
for real per capita GDP by the distance to the equator as in Treisman (2000). Columns (1) 
and (2) in Table 3 show the results of 2SLS estimation where we instrument for both 
remittances and real per capita GDP coastal area and distance to the equator as instruments. 
The coefficient on remittances remains negative and significant in these regressions.  
 
Table 4 shows the result of the 2SLS regressions of Table 2 when we vary the endogenous 
regressors to look at other indicators of institutional quality. We only show the specification 
                                                  
10 We do not show these variations here.  19 
with the religion variables since the results obtained using the other specifications are very 
similar. It is interesting to see that remittances affect the three variables that are most related 
to corruption and government quality. We find a negative and significant coefficient on 
remittances (instrumented by the coastal area) in the regressions where the control of 
corruption, government effectiveness, and the rule of law measures are the dependent 
variables. As for regulatory quality and voice and accountability, they seem unaffected by 
remittances. This in itself is interesting since it suggests that only specific aspects of 
domestic institutional quality – those associated with the diversion of resources by the public 
sector – tend to be affected by the receipt of remittance flows.  
 
C.   Robustness 
In this subsection we try to evaluate the robustness of our results by looking at some of the 
potential problems with our instrumental variable estimation. For an instrumental variable to 
be appropriate it must satisfy two conditions: relevance and exogeneity. The first can be 
verified empirically by looking at the correlation between the instrument and the endogenous 
regressor. In our case we showed that this correlation is strong and that in that respect our 
instrument is not particularly weak. As for the exogeneity condition, it deserves further 
discussion. A clear advantage of our instrument is that it is a geographical variable and 
therefore cannot be endogenous to institutions. This however does not guarantee exogeneity.  
Even if our instrument does not affect the dependent variable directly, it may do so indirectly 
through other channels that are not controlled for in our regression.  In the rest of this section 
we first examine how our results are affected by controlling for a variety of other possible 
channels through which coastal area may affect institutions and then consider the use of an 
alternative instrument. 20 
The alternative channels through which coastal area may affect institutions include the 
following:  
 
Openness: Our instrument is positively correlated (although weakly) with the ratio of trade to 
GDP in our data. This is to be expected through the effect of access to the coast on 
transportation costs. However, including the ratio of trade to GDP on the right hand side does 
not affect our results, as shown in the first column of Table 6. The coefficient on “trade to 
GDP” is positive but not significant.  
 
Demographics: As shown in Table 5, our instrument is positively correlated with a measure 
of urbanization. This is also mentioned in Gallup, Sachs and Mellinger (1999). It is also 
negatively correlated with the dependency ratio and with infant mortality. As shown in 
column 2 of Table 6, however, controlling for these factors does not affect our results 
materially, as the coefficient on instrumented remittances remains negative and significant.  
 
Continents: Another concern is that our instrument may be correlated with continent 
dummies. In fact, African countries on average have less shoreline than countries in other 
continents. Therefore one might suspect that our coefficient might be reflecting differences in 
institutions across continents that are not explained by our other regressors. However, as 
shown in the third column of Table 6, controlling for continent dummies yields a coefficient 
with similar magnitude and significance level to our earlier results.
11  
                                                  
11 Aside from these variables, since our endogenous regressor (the ratio of remittances to GDP) is likely to be 
correlated with a measure of the ratio of the stock of migrants to the total original population at home, one 
might be concerned that our coefficient might reflect a negative impact of emigration on institutions, rather than 




To ensure that our results are robust we also consider an alternative instrument for 
remittances. Specifically, we use as our alternative instrument a measure of the distance 
between each country in our sample and the nearest country that is a large source of 
remittances.  The implicit assumption is that, on average, the closer a country is to a major 
source of remittances the more likely it is that workers from that country will emigrate and 
send remittances back home. Note that this relationship is expected to hold mainly for  
developing countries, rather than for developed ones.  
 
We know that the United States, followed by Western Europe and the Arab Gulf, are the 
largest sources of remittances in the world. Therefore for each country x this variable will 
take the value of the log of the distance between country x and the nearest of these remittance 
sources. Therefore for Latin American countries this variable will be the log of the distance 
between these countries and the US. The same is done for the Caribbean countries. As for 
Africa, we take the simple average of the distances from France and from Saudi Arabia. For 
Asia we use the distance to Saudi Arabia. Taking the distance of the European countries to 
France will, for obvious reasons, lead to a weak instrument as the distance is relatively small 
and received remittances to GDP in these countries are quite low. We can circumvent this 
                                                                                                                                                           
should be expected to be negative.  Indeed, recent literature sees emigration as potentially beneficial to the 
home country. Specifically, authors such as Mountford (1997) and Beine et al. (2003), argue that the possibility 
of emigration raises the expected return on education at home, and thus is likely to increase investment in 
education, which has positive effects on productivity and growth.  Beine et al. (2003) found a positive and 
highly significant effect of migration prospects on gross human capital formation.  The increased stock of 
human capital in the home country may on average have a positive effect on institutions.  Even the older 
literature on migration such as Grubel and Scott (1966) acknowledges that the short-term loss to the original 
country might be well offset in the long run due to spillovers and network effects. 
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problem in three different ways: we can take the distance of the European countries to the 
United States instead, we can add a dummy for Europe as an additional instrument
12, or we 
can exclude these countries from our sample. The three methods yield similar results. In 
Table 7, we show the results from the first and second stage of the 2SLS regressions when 
we use the distance measure as an instrument and we exclude the European countries from 
our sample. Column (3) shows a negative and significant coefficient on remittances. 
Furthermore the coefficient is comparable in magnitude to the one obtained from using the 
coastal area. Column (4) shows a negative yet non-significant coefficient when we use the 
religion variables as regressors. In Table 8, we show that when we use the United States as 
the main remitter for the European countries we obtain similar results. Note that our 
instrument is correlated with the distance to the equator for obvious reasons. In fact the 
correlation in our sample is around -0.56. This is the reason why we control for the distance 
to the equator in our regressions.  
 
IV.   CONCLUSIONS 
We conclude that despite their nature as household-to-household private income transfers, 
remittance inflows may have adverse effects on domestic institutional quality – specifically, 
on the quality of domestic governance – that are similar to those of large resource flows. In 
our analytical model, this effect arises because when households receive remittances, the 
government finds it less costly to free ride on the households and their emigrant relatives and 
divert resources for its own purposes. In other words, because access to remittance income 
                                                  
12 This option might not be appropriate since this dummy might affect directly institutions even after controlling 
for GDP and other religious and legal variables.  23 
makes government corruption less costly for domestic households to bear, the government 
engages in more corruption. Remittances, by acting as a buffer between the government and 
its citizens, give rise to a moral hazard problem; these flows allow households to purchase 
the public good rather than rely solely on the government to provide that good, which 
reduces the household’s incentive to hold the government accountable. The government can 
then free ride and appropriate more resources for its own purposes, rather than channel these 
resources to the provision of public services.   
 
Our empirical results are strongly supportive of this proposition. Using standard 
specifications, and addressing issues of endogeneity and robustness, we consistently find a 
negative and statistically significant partial effect of remittance inflows on institutional 
quality. 
 
One implication is that, while remittance inflows remain welfare-enhancing for the 
representative remittance-receiving household, the increase in household welfare is reduced 
by corruption, and the net increase in household welfare is lower the larger the government’s 
temptation to steal (i.e., the larger the value of β in the government’s objective function). 
This suggests that IFI support for measures to facilitate remittance flows should be 
conditioned on government accountability. Otherwise the gains from such measures may 
accrue to parties other than those for whom they are intended. 
 
Another implication concerns the relationship between remittances and economic growth. 
There is a fairly recent and growing empirical literature that attempts to measure the impact 
of remittances on economic growth. Overall, this literature fails to find a robust positive 24 
effect of worker remittances on growth. One possible reason for such a finding, among 
others, is the presence of several possible mechanisms through which remittances may affect 
growth, some of which identify a positive effect while others a negative one.  
 
On the positive side, remittances may increase investment, facilitate human capital 
formation, enhance total factor productivity (TFP), and may have a favorable effect on the 
financial system, all of which potentially contribute positively to economic growth (see IMF 
2005), World Bank 2006). However, remittances may also hamper economic growth through 
a Dutch Disease effect see for example, Acosta et al. 2007), and Montiel 2006), and by 
reducing labor supply and increasing investment risk (Chami et al. 2003). 
 
This paper identifies a new channel through which remittances can affect economic growth. 
It is a fairly established empirical finding that better institutional quality enhances economic 
growth.
13 Therefore, by worsening the quality of institutions in the recipient country, 
remittances can adversely affect growth. This channel has been missing from the empirical 
literature. Our results suggest that future empirical work on the relationship between 
remittances and growth needs to account for it.  
                                                  
13 See, for example, Hall and Jones (1999), Knack and Keefer (1999), Mauro (1995, 1998), Acemoglu et al. 
(2001), Easterly and Levine (2003), Dollar and Kraay (2003), and Rodrick et al. (2004), among others.  25 
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